News in a political year

Today isn't the first time I have had the opportunity to go and visit NewsJunk, although it is the first time I was made aware that it wasn't just another errant weekend project of Dave Winer's, but instead something with apparent aspirations to supplant (or at least supplement) widely accepted political memetracker Memeorandum. But politics are in the air today, given that the Personal Democracy Forum is in town, and with that came the smell of opportunity for Dave's newest project. From his personal blog today:

I was tuned in to [Robert Scoble's] QikCast of his panel at PDF in NY, and heard him say that Memeorandum was the fastest way to get breaking political news just like Techmeme in the tech blogosphere. I posted a twit, disagreeing, I don't think Memeorandum is good at fast-breaking news, it has a 24-hour cycle, and top stories tend to stick there for the full cycle, keeping other less phenomenal stories that we see quickly in NewsJunk from showing up there at all.

Sometimes they show up 24 hours after they happen! That's just not good enough for news in a political year. That's why we started NewsJunk - to scratch the itch that Nicco and I (and many others) had. We tried to imagine the news system that Chuck Todd deserved, or Joe Trippi, David Axelrod, Josh Marshall or even Barack Obama himself. (McCain, only being "aware" of the Internet is not in a position to use it).

I can't fault him on that. He saw the opportunity, and he took it (even if writing about how he hoodwinked one of his buddies after the fact is a little bit … poor form?). I decided to give the site another look. The last time I took a look, it seemed to be completely dominated by nothing but left wing stories, with story descriptions that could only be described as narrowly opinionated. In my initial visit to the site, it was clear to me that Dave Winer's clear favoritism for Barack Obama and dislike for Hillary or anything representing an alternative viewpoint played heavy in the site's selection of news stories.

The role of the state in Rome's grain trade

L. Casson, The role of the state in Rome's grain trade p22. Musti, Il commercio degli schiavi e del grano: Il caso di Puteoli p204-205, N. Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland; The city of Rome and the Italian economy 200 B.C. - A.D. 200 p88. 35 N. Purcell, Wine and wealth in ancient Rome p5. 36 Jongman, consumption p605, N. Purcell, Wine and Wealth p14. 37 Cato, De Agricultura p167. 38 Jongman, Het Romeins imperialisme en de verstedelijking van Italië p51. 39 Jongman, Romeins imperialisme p51.

hectoliter per jaar werd gedronken.40 Met 2000 liter per hectare is dat 400.000 hectare ofwel 4000 km². Dat zou al vier procent van het hele areaal zijn in Italië. Loubère schrijft dat de oogst rond 1870 zo'n 2300 liter per hectare bedroeg. 41 De kwalitatief mindere wijnen bestonden slechts voor een kleiner gedeelte uit de daadwerkelijke druif. Volgens Cato gebruikte men (voor een veel voorkomende soort, dus niet elitaire wijn) 10 qaudrantali (260 liter) most, dit is het sap van de druiven vermengd met suiker. 2 quadrantali van sterke azijn, 2 gekookte wijn en 50 quadrantali water. Daaruit blijkt dat slechts 18% uit pure oogst bestond.42 In Campanië blijkt dat de akkers op de vlakte graan produceerden en in de heuvels wijn en olijven, het sterftecijfer op de vlakte lag hoger. Het sterftecijfer kan gezien worden als de graadmeter voor welvaart.

Ook bleken de wijnboeren veelal vrije boeren te zijn en hadden de graanboeren een feodaal karakter.43 Een reden hiervoor is dat het drie jaar duurt voordat een wijnrank druiven gaat geven. Een kleine boer heeft de middelen niet om drie jaar te wachten op zijn eerste productie. Degene die een wijngaard wilde beginnen moest dus al een bepaalde welvaart bezitten of andere middelen van inkomsten tijdens die eerste drie jaren. Ik ga mij in dit betoog verder niet bezig houden met de status van de boer. Want een vrije boer of een boer die pacht dient te betalen, of zelfs een slaaf, zij zullen gelijk produceren. Erdkamp merkt op dat het risico van de landeigenaar met wijnranken laag was. De landeigenaar verkocht de druiven als ze nog aan de rank zaten en degene die het gekocht had droeg zorg voor de oogst en verwerking. Hierdoor had de landeigenaar nog minder arbeidsuren nodig op zijn land, wat het aantrekkelijker maakte om over te stappen op druiven in plaats van graan.44 'by buying grapes on the vine the negotiatores45 gambled on the size and quality of the harvest, and on the state of the market when the wine was ready'.

The first novel I ever read

"Whose ponderous grate and massy bar Had oft rolled back the tide of war," just as, at Foulshiels, on Yarrow, we beheld the very roofless cottage whence Mungo Park went forth to trace the waters of the Niger, and at Oakwood the tower of the Wizard Michael Scott.

Probably the first I ever read was read at Elgin, and the story was Probably the first novel I ever read was read at Elgin, and the story was "Jane Eyre." This tale was a creepy one for a boy of nine, and Rochester was a mystery, St. John a bore. But the lonely little girl in her despair, when something came into the room, and her days of starvation at school, and the terrible first Mrs. Rochester, were not to be forgotten. They abide in one's recollection with a Red Indian's ghost, who carried a rusty ruined gun, and whose acquaintance was made at the same time.

I fancy I was rather an industrious little boy, and that I had minded my lessons, and satisfied my teachers--I know I was reading Pinnock's "History of Rome" for pleasure--till "the wicked day of destiny" came, and I felt a "call," and underwent a process which may be described as the opposite of "conversion." The "call" came from Dickens. "Pickwick" was brought into the house. From that hour it was all over, for five or six years, with anything like industry and lesson-books. I read "Pickwick" in convulsions of mirth. I dropped Pinnock's "Rome" for good. I neglected everything printed in Latin, in fact everything that one was understood to prepare for one's classes in the school whither I was now sent, in Edinburgh.

French Calion Bank Polemic

On the other hand, the Housing Minister denied any relation to the deal. He mentioned that the Transport Minister Mohammed Mansour approved the Calion deal before holding the Cabinet post. The Minister of Housing and Construction, Ahmad Al Magharbi declared that the measures taken in selling Alexandria shares in the Egyptian-American Bank agreed with the state system, as it came under the Central Bank supervision.

The Minister of Housing, in an interview with the parliamentary editors, yesterday, said that the Minister of Transport Mohammed Mansour and he were mistakenly included in this deal. The Minister, in response to a question raised by Al Ahram's correspondent, Mahmoud Al Minawi, said that Mansour was not yet a minister when he approved the French Calion Bank deal and that Al Mansour- Al Maghrabi company was formed in Dec. 28th last year. He believed that Al Maghrabi did not carry out any trade activity since he held the cabinet post; meaning that he did not violate article 155 in the constitution. He confirmed he still had a share of 5% in the above-mentioned company and that he would not sell it .

Some of the People's Assembly members including Mostafa Bakri and Jamal Zahran raised the topic saying that selling Alexandria Bank's share in the Egyptian American Bank was related to special interests of the two ministers; Ahmad Al Maghrabi and Mohammed Mansour who had 25% in Calion Bank. The central Bank governor, Farouk Al Okda, believed that much ado was raised over the deal amid a shortage of the full facts. He added that the selling operation was not carried out till now, it was just a promise. Mostafa Bakri said there was probably a constitutional violation concerning wasting the public money . He indicated that the value of one share in Alexandria Bank reached, before the Greater Barium 56 pounds, yet, it was agreed to be sold at 45 pounds only !!

Such a deal raised a polemic over the government's tendency to sell the successful private banks that achieved profits in addition to its shares in banks and joint vebtures amid its plan to reform the Banking System. Yet, it left the economically-weak banks that had its losses and were unable to either locally or internationally among the foreign and ign and the big private banks. Some feared that these measures were done for the interest of the foreign banks on the expense of the Egyptian ones.

Ethnographic analogy

Ethnographic analogy remains an important research tool because identifying the actual evidence of land use in archaeological record is a very difficult task considering the geomorphology of the Middle Nile Valley. Ancient fields, palm groves and animal pastures have never been successfuly identified by means of archaeological fieldwork and/or remote sensing. We only have the material remains such as the qaduz vessels, various agricultural tools and implements, as well as plant remains and animal bones, although in the Letti area we have found at least one emplacement of a medieval saqyia. Several Old Nubian texts from Qasr Ibrim specifically refer to the land deeds and sales of land and frequently mention the saqiyas (Brown 1991). Otherwise we have little knowledge about the land use in the period under consideration. Future archaeological investigations must clearly find a way to address these problems, perhaps by means of remote sensing, searching the archives (see e.g. Grzymski and Anderson 2001:5-6) and studying the early travellers reports.

Another interesting area of investigation would be the industrial landscape. In terms of technological studies only the Nubian pottery production and Meroitic iron making were adequately studied. An even more important issue, however, is not the technology per se, but how factors other than agricultural production, affected the rise and fall of certain sites and regions. The site catchment analysis is hardly adequate as an explanatory tool for the non-agricultural situation in the non-market economy of an early agrarian society. Despite the seeming corellation between the site distribution patterns and the soil one should seriously consider the possibility of non-agricultural origins of settlements and political centres in Nubia.

the saqiya problem

A good example would be the saqiya problem. It is universally agreed that the introduction of saqiya had tremendous impact on the agriculture of Nubia. Clearly, the expansion of arable land and the resulting increase of food production must have had a dramatic impact on the economic and social life. However, if the saqyia was introduced only at the very end of the Meroitic period as has been recently suggested by Edwards (1996:80-81), then we have a problem of perception versus reality. The Post-Meroitic period is usually considered to have been a period of social, cultural and economic decline, yet the spread of the saqiya would be expected to result in the increased prosperity.

Perhaps our perception is incorrect and it was indeed during the Post-Meroitic rather than Meroitc period that a truly prosperous agrarian (and pastoral?) society developed culminating later on in the Classic Christian period? Yet, intuitively, and despite the presence of rich royal burials in Ballana and Qustul, and the obtrusive remains of the millions of tumuli in Central Sudan (Lenoble 1992:90-91) we tend to see the Meroitic civilization as representing the peak of cultural and economic development in ancient Nubia. Indeed, Trigger stated so explicitly by suggesting the highest population numbers in Lower Nubia during that period (60,000 inhabitants in the Ptolemaic/Roman/Meroitic Nubia vs. 44,000 during the Post-Meroitic and 50, 000 during the Christian Period, Trigger 1965:160).

Singapore Cultural Industries

My second aim in this paper is to examine the reception of and attempts to negotiate (and at times, contest) these policies by "cultural practitioners" themselves. In so doing, I will illustrate how there is a severe disjuncture between the state's policies and the intents of practitioners, which may be appropriately cast as a conflict between social and cultural development priorities as envisaged by the practitioners as opposed to economic development priorities as embodied in the state's cultural economic policies.

My analyses in this paper are motivated as much by a perceived lacuna in the academic literature as a commitment to policy analysis. Much of the literature on cultural policies, particularly cultural economic policies and the regeneration of cities, has focused on Western countries, mainly in the U.S. and Europe, and more recently, the U.K. and Australia (Frith, 1991; Watson, 1991; Bassett, 1993; Bianchini, 1993a; Scott, 1997; Williams, 1997). Most of the work examines the historical development of cultural policy, often highlighting early tendencies to neglect the economic potential of the arts and subsequent discovery and appropriation as a response to global capital restructuring. Some recent works have begun to explore the interconnections between capitalist production processes and the cultural content of outputs, and how this is reflected in the growth and development of particular places (Scott, 1997; Waterman, 1998).

At a more micro-level of analysis, others have examined specific aspects of cultural industries, such as the contribution of the cultural industries sector to employment and trade (Pratt, 1997a; 1997b), and economic organisation of particular cultural industries (for example, Sadler, 1997, on the music industry). Such analyses have been kept distinct from examinations of cultural policies from the perspective of socio-cultural and political agendas. Where such research has been done, particularly in non-Western, developing country contexts, the tendency has been to focus on questions of cultural imperialism: addressing questions about whether there is in fact cultural imperialism at work, and attempts by states through policy and various actions to halt or at least ameliorate such impacts (see, for example, Wallis and Malm, 1984; and Shuker, 1994). Little work has been done which focuses on the intersection between cultural economic policies and those cultural policies which bear socio-cultural and political agendas. In the context of Singapore, no systematic attention has been given to analysis of cultural policies (see, however, Koh, 1989). Particularly given Singapore's penchant towards developmentalism (see below) and its relatively nascent stage in the construction of nationhood, this issue bears scrutiny.